



The evolution of Chinese angels; social ties and institutional development 
 
Abstract 
Informed by Mike Wright’s insight on entrepreneurial finance research problems, we 
examine how Chinese angel finance has evolved with institutional changes over two 
decades. Our longitudinal cases explore the changing roles of personal ties within 
strengthening regulatory institutions. Rather than the diminishing role anticipated, we 
found personal ties remained vital for investment decisions. Although the improved 
regulatory environment influenced the extent and volume of investment, encouraging 
greater and longer investments, personal ties still informed decisions. We conclude 
angel finance practice has evolved to match the changing Chinese environment. 
Social ties no longer comprehensively determine investment decisions. Instead, 
personal ties complement the improving environment. The trust embodied in ties 
continues to facilitate deal making by quick decisions and simple contracts. 
Importantly, we noted how trust reshaped moral hazards and agency problems 
through the moral obligations of ties. Thus, trust in the individual took more account of 
the business, but remained centred on personal integrity. 
  
We also found how ties with government officials, historically vital in uncertain 
environments, had become much less important as confidence in the regulatory 
regime improved. The paper contributes to our understanding of institutions and 
practices. It highlights culture’s continuing role by addressing Mike Wright’s concerns 
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Introduction 
Mike Wright laid much of the groundwork for venture capital enquiry in 1988 (Wright 
and Robbie, 1998) by identifying what was distinctive about equity risk finance, 
especially the problem of asymmetrical information. Wright et al (1998) argued for 
the critical role of angel finance as ‘informal’ venture capital, not least for stimulating 
a country’s entrepreneurial base (De Clercq et al, 2012; Jiang et al 2014). Venture 
Capital is an increasingly important phenomenon, but geographically diverse (Wright 
et al, 2005). Zahra and Wright thus argued ‘research should address the 
heterogeneity of the contexts in which entrepreneurial activities take place’ 
(2011:72). Theories developed in one context may offer a poor explanation in other 
institutional settings (Bruton et al, 2010); research needs to be locally contextualised, 
but loosely coupled to global debates (Wright, 2007). Our study is set in the context 
of China’s remarkable growth and institutional changes (Ge et al, 2017) and engages 
with debates about entrepreneurial practices and institutions (Estrin et al, 2019). 
Mike’s interest in Chinese VC (Lockett and Wright, 2002) highlighted the economic 
importance of China and the unique context of business practices, culture and legal 
systems. He signalled a need to understand the vagaries of the investment process 
(Cumming et al., 2019), especially as China becomes a mid-range economy 
(Hoskisson et al, 2013). Moreover, Jiang et al (2014) noting VC growth, commented 
that VC research in China remained limited. Nonetheless, Mike noted how venture 
capitalists’ decisions were less dependent on market, product, and strategy (Wright 




institutions are not well developed, VCs may rely on informal institutions in 
relationships (Wright et al, 2005a). Similarly, Batjargal and Liu (2004) recognised the 
importance of relationships for Chinese venture capital. They emphasised the 
significance of existing relationships or referrals. Wright (2007) observed that in a 
weak institutional environment such as China’s, enforcing contingent contracts may 
be problematical, hence relationships involving trust may be a substitute.   
Zahra and Wright (2014) explain that although the role of informal institutions is well 
recognised, their cultural foundations are often overlooked. Moreover, Bruton et al 
(2009) suggest that economies such as China provide a natural laboratory for 
institutional change. Sun et al (2010) note how three decades of transition in China 
are characterized by gradual experimentation using a variety of pre-reform 
institutional legacies. Accordingly, ‘A greater contribution to our understanding the 
development of VC markets is provided by papers that have used some dimension 
of an institutional perspective’ (Wright et al, 2005a:146). Mike also pointed out ‘an 
under‐researched area concerns the influence of institutional contexts, especially the 
role of social networks and cultures’ (2005:135). 
Our research problem 
Put simply, some scholars thought that as China’s formal institutions developed, the 
use of informal institutions (e.g. social ties) for economic exchanges would diminish 
(Peng, 2003; Autio and Fu, 2015). However, others (Wank, 2002; Gambetta, 2000; 
Kim et al, 2016; Fredström et al, 2020) challenge this. This debate however pays 
little attention to how network tie practices may also develop in a changing 
environment.  A recurring feature of networks is how they change and develop to 




adapting to institutional changes (Anderson and Yiu-Chung Lee, 2008).  The 
relationships between changing institutions and practices are likely to be dynamic 
(Hoskisson et al, 2013; Wright et al, 2005) and nuanced, rather than a simple 
transition from informality. To understand these changes, we developed longitudinal 
case studies examining business angels’ practices over time, arguing their close 
engagement with their investment (Bruton et al., 2010b) enables a sharp personal, 
rather than corporate, focus on culturally informed practices (Huang, 2018).  Our 
research problem was to establish how ties were used. 
Institutional transition research proposes that informal institutions substitute for weak 
and inefficient formal institutions (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Bruton et al., 2010a; 
Batjargal et al., 2013). Informal institutions are relational and their ties (e.g. 
entrepreneur-investor ties and government connections) function within cultural 
environments (Ding et al., 2014); whereas, formal institutions form the regulatory 
environment within which informal institutions operate. Moreover, angel investors 
typically rely more on relational governance (Fiet, 1995; Drover et al., 2017; Xiao and 
Steier, 2020). Xu and Meyer (2013) argued that Wright and colleagues focus on 
institutional theory is a major foundation for studying transition economies. Building 
on this theory and the entrepreneurial finance literature (Hoskisson et al., 2013), our 
longitudinal case studies capture changes in the role of personal network ties. 
Between 1990 and 2016, we followed three investment programmes. This period 
saw major institutional change and improvement, so we were able to establish the 
dynamics of personal ties and institutional change.  
China offers an interesting case. Institutional environments for the private economy 
and informal financial market have steadily improved from the constitutional 




private investors. As figure 1 shows, these move from permitting to promoting the 
private sector. We see how private finance has not only been formally recognised, 
but encouraged.  Over time, legislative uncertainties have reduced (Xiao, 2011; Xiao 
and North, 2012; Smallbone et al., 2020). Moreover, the Chinese angel finance 
market is maturing, playing an increasingly critical role in venture creation processes 
(Batjargal, 2010; Batjargal et al., 2013). China has seen a remarkable expansion of 
the private equity industry (Xiao, 2020). Indeed, China is now the largest private 
equity industry in the world (Zero2ipo, 2016). In 2015, the Chinese risk capital fund 
pool reached CNY1 5 trillion (including CNY 2.2 trillion government backed pool), 
overtaking the US.  Moreover, the number of risk capital firms actively investing in 
new and young firms reached 10,000 in 2015. This remarkable expansion and 
maturing situation offers a dynamic context for examining process and change in 
angels’ practices.  
In fact, we found persistent and continuing importance of entrepreneur-investor ties, 
but decreasing use of government connections. We saw how strong ties reduced the 
complexity of contracts and enabled fast deals. Moreover, the agency problem, 
where funded firms might pursue their own, rather than investors’ interests, was 
subsumed within the perceived moral obligations of ties. Put simply, investors trusted 
individuals to safeguard their interests. Moral hazard around investment loss was 
diverted into the integrity of the individual, almost regardless of how the new venture 
was operated. For government ties, the key issue had been about gaining access. 
However, the better regulated regime reduced the need for personalised access. 
                                                          




Theoretically, we contribute by demonstrating that treating informal relationships as a 
substitute for formal obligations and contracts is misleading. The culturally 
embedded obligations of strong tie relationships is too powerful and too useful to 
jettison for a transactional, legal agreement. Nonetheless, more robust regulatory 
environment helped to create confidence in the context, whilst network ties enabled 
investment processes within that context. As Puffer et al. (2010) described, stronger 
regulation improved confidence in perceptions about investment generally, and 
reduced regularity risk.  Conceptually, we propose that improved regulatory 
environment is structural, creating greater confidence in reduced institutional 
uncertainty. However, ties and relationships are processual, hence enable and 
facilitate investment deals. Originally, relationships may well have substituted for 
legal uncertainty. But in the present, stronger legal environment relationships 
complement the greater structural certainty by facilitating deals on culturally informed 
personal obligation. Networks and ties thus simplify deal making and work to 
complement improved formal institutions. 
Metaphorically, in the early stages the institutional environment was a stormy sea, 
with unpredictable currents and capricious weather. Network ties created a sea 
anchor to offer some stability in this turbulence; offering some predictability but 
buffeted by uncertainties. The sea has been calmed and horizons made visible. Ties 
are now less about weathering storms, the sea anchor has become a sail to propel 
the deal. 
Improving regulatory institutions increased businesses confidence generally by 
reducing some structural uncertainties (Xiao and North, 2012, Smallbone et al., 
2020). However, network ties work at a different level, they relate to individual 




enable decision processes and are profoundly social. Accordingly, we argue 
business practices remain deeply embedded in Chinese culture, where personal 
relationships continue to inform commercial transactions. We thus offer theoretical 
insights into institutional theory addressing the ambiguity about the changing role of 
personal network ties within improving regulatory institutions (Peng and Zhou, 2005). 
Theoretical framework; dynamics of institutional transitions and angel finance  
 
Mike Wright firmly believed that institutions helped explain practice (Estrin et al. 2019; 
De Clercq et al. 2015). Moreover, in a conversation with Gartner and Welter (Welter 
et al, 2016), he proposed we also need to look at the interactions of exogenous and 
endogenous dimensions of contexts. For us, this signals the significance of formal 
institutions offering structure and informal enabling specific practices within that 
structure.  North (1990) classically defined institutions as constraints that human 
beings devise to shape human interaction. Institutions take two forms; formal (e.g. 
laws, regulations, rules) and informal (e.g. social norms, cultures, ethics).  
 
Baumol (1996) formalised the idea that formal institutions structure entrepreneurial 
practices and there is a wealth of evidence to support this at a macro level (Harbi and 
Anderson, 2010). The micro dynamics of informal institutions shed light on the agency 
in entrepreneurial practice (Anderson and Ronteau, 2017).  Moreover, cultures 
endorse specific practices (Anderson and Smith, 2007). Yet Bruton et al. (2010a) draw 
our attention to risks in attributing too much to culture. Nonetheless, the dynamics of 
macro-level and micro-level institutions, as well as the relationships between personal 
network ties and formal contracts are useful in explaining firm behaviours and 




examining contexts at the early phase of institutional transitions, notes the lack of legal 
protection for private property and perceived difficulties in enforcing a formal contract 
(Wright et al., 2005b; Peng and Zhou, 2005; Cumming et al., 2010; Puffer et al., 2010).  
 
Personal network ties exerted some control over economic exchanges at the early 
phase of transitions (Peng, 2003; Xiao and Ritchie, 2009); a consequence of the 
weaker and inefficient regulatory institutions (Le and Nguyen, 2009; Li and Zahra, 
2012; Scheela and Jittrapanun, 2012). Such network ties are typically embedded in, 
and formed from social and cultural roots (McKeever et al, 2014). They create a high 
level of trust, cooperation and dependability (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Huang, 2008).   
Scholars note how ties encourage entrepreneurs to fulfil their promises, thus 
managing possible opportunistic behaviours of entrepreneurs (Batjargal and Liu, 
2004). Ties also compensate for the absence of reliable accounts and information 
asymmetry (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Ding et al., 2015). 
In weaker legal regimes and regulatory institutions, investors relied on ties to solve 
disputes and enforce agreements (Trester, 1998; Batjargal et al., 2013).   
 
Moreover, legislation-based uncertainties made entrepreneur’s network ties with 
government officials essential for a venture’s creation, survival, and growth (Peng and 
Luo, 2000; Peng, 2003; Anderson and Lee, 2008; Meyer et al., 2009; Bruton et al., 
2010a). Government connections offer access and competitive advantage in weaker 
institutional environments (Li et al., 2008; Zhou, 2013). Furthermore, government 
connections signalled positive perceptions to suppliers and clients (Wright, 2007).  
Studies demonstrated such connections acting as a vicarious institution and a kind of 




transitions (i.e. Russia - Batjargal, 2006; Meyer et al., 2009).  Xiao (2011) found that 
these connections were included in evaluation criteria that early-stage investors used 
to make investment decisions. Nonetheless, it might be expected that increasing 
marketisation of the economy would reduce the importance of these ties (Lee and 
Anderson, 2007). In summary, we ask if the role of network ties has diminished or 
merely changed in the new stronger environment. 
 
Research methods  
 
We use longitudinal case studies to explore the evolution of angel finance and ties’ 
role for developing theory. Case studies are particularly useful of developing well 
grounded theory (Yin, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999) and Koze and Lewin 
(1999) suggest that longitudinal case studies provide a means of understanding the 
dynamics of network ties as they adapt to new circumstance. Our longitudinal case 
study approach enabled us to detect subtle and dynamic changes in investment 
processes and practices. Our research design examined changes in the use and role 
of ties in investment decision-making over three periods. 
Time and change 
We examine three consecutive periods featuring episodic changes in formal 
institutions (see Figure 1) and collected empirical data during each period.   
Period I (late 1990s to 2004) characterised by relatively weak regulatory institutions,  
Period II (2005 to 2009) with relatively stronger regulatory institutions, 




Figure 1 about here  
During period I, the regulatory framework lagged far behind growth of the private 
sector (Tsai, 2002; Ayyagari et al., 2008). Indeed, the legal rights and interests of 
private enterprises were not constitutionally protected by the state until 2004 (see 
Figure 1). There was an absence of a stable rule of law and effective enforcement 
regime to safeguard investments (Cardis et al., 2001; Lu and Tao, 2013; De Clercq et 
al., 2013). Under such a weak legal system, individual investors played a limited angel 
role, typically providing small amounts of capital or credit to meet urgent needs for 
short-term finance, differing substantially from that in developed market-oriented 
countries (Hitt et al, 2004). Entrepreneur-investor ties and government connections 
were much more important than formal contracts in determining investment decisions. 
A very simple agreement was commonly used to govern exchanges. Nonetheless, 
local government officials sometimes used their power to help young firms navigate 
the challenging environment characterised by the weak protection of private property 
and problematic enforcement of contracts (Butler et al., 2003; Peng, 2003; Tan et al., 
2009).  
Period II saw strengthening regulatory institutions with the granting of a legal status of 
private lending companies in 2006. The State continued to issue national level policies 
further promoting the development of private sector. Provincial and local governments 
introduced legislation to protect businesses legal rights and interests and offered more 
support. The institutional infrastructure for angel finance improved (Lundstrom and 
Stevenson, 2005) so that informal finance became the main source for early and 
subsequent stages of growth (Tsai, 2017). Individual investors began providing longer-
term risk capital; but typically, only to entrepreneurs with whom they had longstanding 




Period III saw the establishment of institutional infrastructure for the private economy 
and informal financial market. New policies and regulations were introduced by the 
State to further support private investments (see Figure 1). Formal enforceable 
contracts become possible for investors (Xiao and North, 2018). Broadly, structural 
uncertainties were progressively reduced. This improved legislative environment 
matched the continued rapid growth of the venture capital industry. It also supported 
exits from investments (Batjargal et al., 2013). Consequently, the informal financial 
market thrived, the volume of financial transactions increased (Tsai, 2017) and 
became longer term (Xiao, 2020).  Accordingly, in this more mature environment for 
investment, we expected to see an increase in the formality of the investment 
processes such as due diligence and a reduction in the personalisation of decision 
making; a shift away from a personal relationship to a focus on the proposal. 
Data collection 
We held three programmes of face to face interviews (2004, 2009 and 2015-2016) 
with investors who had provided loans or risk capital. From these data, we developed 
the three longitudinal cases A, B, and C. These cases are ongoing and involve a 
multiyear retrospective analysis. Each case included the investor, all the investments 
made and the entrepreneurs of the funded ventures during the periods. It is worth 
noting that the early investments included in this study were made in the later 1990s. 
In total, we held 37 interviews; 30 interviews with individual investors and seven 
interviews with entrepreneurs of the investee firms. 
 
Case A: Lao Luo (fictitious name) was born in a poor village in 1965. He left home 
for higher education in 1981. He then earned a Masters’ degree in 




post in another elite university. This promising career was short lived, after four years 
he quit to start his own business in Shenzhen. This imported and sold high-end 
batteries to research institutes and universities. This business did really well and 
quickly made his fortune.  
In 1998, he turned his attention to financing other businesses. Initially this involved in 
supporting his friends running businesses in the same industry by offering small 
amounts of finance. When we asked about how he made decisions he explained he 
knew entrepreneurs, their family, and business activities really well. His role was to 
be an angel in his community.  
Table 1 about here 
Case A includes five longer-term equity investments and tens of short-term 
investments that Luo has provided to connected ventures from the late 1990s to 
2016. Table 1 summarises the attributes and performance of those equity 
investments as well as features of social ties.  
Case B: Zhu Zi (fictitious name) was born in a poor village in 1963. He became the 
youngest lecturer of fibre-optic communication at an elite university when he was 
earning a Master’s degree from a top university.  He was quickly promoted to a 
professor. His success in academia did not prevent him from establishing his own 
business in the late 1990s. He too made a lot of money quickly, dominating the 
Shanghai and Beijing market for imported scientific batteries. 
 
His remarkable business success made him a target investor for  his family and friends’ 
businesses. In 2003, his nephew began a business manufacturing navigation devices, 




helping the new generation of his family in their career. One interesting elements of 
this social obligation was to accept a high level of risk in the investments. To balance 
this, he made several investments, hoping that one of his investee ventures would 
have a successful IPO. 
Table 2 about here 
Case B offered eight longer-term equity investments and tens of short-term 
investments to connected ventures during the studied periods. Table 2 shows the 
attributes and performance of those equity investments as well as features of social 
ties involved.  
Case C: Zhang Hong (fictitious name) had a different career path from the other cases. 
He was born in a city in 1964. After obtaining a first degree in telecommunication 
technology in 1985, he joined the Army for a couple of years, but then secured a senior 
position at a large state-owned telecom company in Shenzhen. This was a period of 
remarkable transitions in China and the opening of opportunities in the private sector 
for the brave. Like many friends, he quit ‘the iron rice bowl’ of the state sector to begin 
manufacturing producing fibre-related electricity products in the early 2000s. The 
business developed into becoming a key player in the industry.  
 
Similar to our other respondents, commercial success led to a high profile and many 
contracts and connections. Hong was active in the community and become well 
informed about what was going on, including financial needs and investment 
opportunities. Initially he supported friends by offering modest working capital. This 
led to becoming an angel investor. His approach was based on a strong belief in 
building strategic alliances, rather than simply investing. Accordingly, he invested in 




Table 3 about here 
Case C had two longer-term equity investments and tens of short-term investments. 
Table 3 displays the attributes and performance of the equity investments as well as 
features of social ties.                               
Longitudinal case study development 
Figure 2 describes the case studies, 2004-2016. From previous work, we had a 
sample of 74 firms from which we selected 6 who had provided finance to other firms. 
These formed our original cases. We asked them broad exploratory questions; how 
did you know about the investment opportunity? How did you evaluate the venture and 
the risk? We also enquired about personal network ties; how did you know the 
entrepreneur? How did that influence the investment decisions? How did personal 
network ties work?   
                                        Figure 2 about here 
 
The 2009 interviews found that only four of the original sample continued to invest. 
We revisited the original themes and added the theme of experience; tell me about the 
investment performance and why was this? Did your investment performance impact 
on new investment decisions and practices?  
 
Preliminary analysis of the 2004 and 2009 interviews suggested some changes to the 
characteristics of offers (e.g. increased amount of capital and term) and subtle 
changes to the influences of personal network ties for decision-making. After the 2016 




worth noting that one case without interviews with entrepreneurs of the investee 




Given our interest in practice and change (Figure 3), we analysed the 2004 data 
employing thematic analysis (Jack et al, 2015). The interviewees had actively talked 
about network ties with either themselves or a third party and where those ties 
originated. Analytical constructs of long-standing relations, high level of trust and 
dependability emerged from the data. Analysing the role of personal network ties in 
decision-making, process constructs (i.e. helping gather faithful and less biased 
information, confidence about reduced relational risk, ability to help deal with 
legislation-related uncertainties, helping win contacts and gaining access to 
resources) helped us distinguish the role of entrepreneur-investor ties from 
government connections. When examining investment practices, items such as simple 
agreements, quick decisions and perception of the venture appeared. Analysis of the 
2009 interview data was guided by these constructs but looked for changes. We 
repeated this for the 2016 data. 
Figure 3 about here 
Our final task transformed these data into our cases charting the evolution of practices 
in context (Yin, 1981).  Distinctive patterns of each case emerged and were compared 







An early, but enduring, finding was the critical role of social connections. This was 
explained as how culture stressed the importance of personal ties in determining 
responsibilities and obligations. We saw how the tie was a relationship between 
people, but operationalised commercially. This, we were told, is how business is done 
in China. We saw this as an ‘informal’ cultural institution. The logic was that given the 
unpredictability of the environment, the investment was in the entrepreneur. Chinese 
culture imposes responsibility on the entrepreneur to fulfil his promises, regardless of 
how the new business fares, or how the environment changes. Reliance was placed 
on the individual, regardless of the formal environment.  
 
Evolution of early stage angel finance and embedded personal network ties  
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 indicates a remarkable change from offering short-term lending to 
longer-term risk capital to early-stage ventures as the regulatory institutions improved. 
Nonetheless, investors clearly preferred to build a business partnership with those 
embedded in a long-standing network relationship. This remained largely unchanged, 
regardless of the improving regulatory institutions. As an informant commented about 
his equity investment of CNY 500,000 for 10% of the manufacturing business shares: 
“Making the decision was rather easy for me. We were university classmates and keep 
in touch on a regular basis”. Looked at from a purely economic logic, this long-standing 
relationship offers little explanation. Why should a shared academic background 
provide confidence for an economic transaction?  We can recognise similarities to 
western appreciations of the value of social capital (Anderson and Jack, 2002) and 
how knowing the ‘other’ in exchanges eases transactions (Anderson and Hardwick, 




based on mutual affiliations, a ‘special relationship’ (Zhao et al, 2010; Ding et al., 
2014). We propose this is a cultural outcome of, and a social response to China’s 
traditional hierarchical structure and the ensuing low trust society described by 
Fukuyama (1995).  
 
Compared to angels in developed countries, our Chinese angel investors employ close 
social links, associations or shared experiences, typically relating to shared elements 
of personal identity (see Table 1);  (i) school/university (i.e. former classmates), (ii) 
place of work (i.e. former colleagues, clients, suppliers), (iii) kinship (i.e. family friends), 
and (iv) home town. Investing in people with shared culturally rooted social identities 
suggests, regardless of transitioning regulatory institutions, the value placed on trust 
and dependability within a social and cultural link (Huang & Wang, 2011; Fukuyama, 
1995; Ding et al., 2015).  
Table 1 about here 
 
Evolution was demonstrated within the deepening patterns of financial involvement. 
Short-term finance successfully repaid encouraged investors to explore longer-term 
investments. We attribute this to the similarly deepening experience of the relationship. 
Trust in, and experience of, the integrity of the people and trust in their capability built 
a strong personalised foundation for developing the informal financial market. 
Experienced investors started to provide equity finance to businesses, especially for 
high growth firms. However, our analysis shows that for investments made before 
2010, the returns and performance were not as good as investors had hoped (see 




institutions. For us, this reflection of continuing uncertainties illustrates the practical 
logic of investing in the relationship rather than the business. 
 
Despite the poorer performance, in the 2010s investors continued to offer equity 
capital to early-stage ventures, but with a marked change towards investing in early-
stage ventures within their area of expertise. Investors A and B invested a total amount 
of CNY 500,000 of equity capital in a start-up producing CMOS sensors for 8% of the 
business shares in 2014 respectively. The two investors had previously owned 
business in the same field in the 1990s and had specific industry expertise. Investor 
C stated: “I was delighted to offer US $100,000 for 3% of business shares to my client 
company producing Z-Chips in 2015.” (Case C, 2015 interview). These findings 
demonstrate a relationship built on shared experiences and perceptions, but extended 
into commercial transactions. We saw this as a trust platform which investors 
employed to inform decisions. 
 
However, investors A and B were initially less selective about the type of firm and 
offered funding to firms operating outside their experience. Decisions were entirely 
based on the long-standing personal relationships 2004 to 2009. Later, advanced 
industry knowledge was added to the evaluation criteria (Cases A and B). 
Nonetheless, investor C only provided funding to firms run by his university classmates 
operating in the same industry (Case C). Clearly, entrepreneur-investor ties continued 
to be the determining factor even as the evolution was informed by industry 
experience.  
 





Our analysis indicates the continuing importance and role of embedded entrepreneur-
investor ties. Table 2 demonstrates how investors also employed entrepreneur-
investor ties from rooted social links to understand opportunities and gather timely, 
accurate and useful information, regardless of the improving institutions at both macro 
and micro-level. Shared views and values, social closeness, provided a basis for 
discussing and informing the investment opportunity as well as the potential 
partnership at an early stage of development; even before a venture was created. 
Investor A commented: “we knew the business idea before discussing about the 
investment potential since we chat about our businesses on a regular basis.” (Case A, 
2015 interview). Investor B, analysing his equity investment in a business solution firm 
founded and run by his former colleague, who is also from the same province, stated: 
“the entrepreneur was so excited about the fast growth of his business each time 
chatting to me. I had learnt about the business before being invited to be a business 
partner and made my investment decisions quite quickly” (Case B, 2009 interview). 
Ties informed investors about the project, but supported by knowledge about an 
entrepreneur’s family, clients, suppliers and ambitions through previous 
conversations. Investors believed this information gathered through the shared social 
links was comprehensive, faithful, and less biased for evaluating the quality of the 
venture and risk (Pollack and Bosse, 2014). Trust and integrity remained key, as 
investor A commented: “my investment to the venture was a convertible offer. I believe 
the entrepreneur would sell his properties to pay me back if things went wrong.” (Case 
A, 2015). For us, this comment signals belief in the integrity of the individual. It clearly 





Table 2 about here 
 
Shared views and values, as well as shared personal identities worked to improve 
investors’ confidence. The emphasis was trust built through entrepreneur-investor ties 
and less on commercial elements when making their decisions (Mitteness et al., 2016, 
2012). As investor B stated: “the offer that I made was based entirely on the 
entrepreneur whom I knew since we were 6 years old, and we always chat about our 
businesses and life” (Case B). It reflects how bonded relationships caused investors 
to rely on a few of key, largely personal and contextual elements rather than a full set 
of evaluation criteria for funding decisions.   Moreover, trust in the individual becomes 
a heuristic means of mitigating perceived risks. 
 
Changing influence of entrepreneur-investor ties 
 
We note how entrepreneur-investor ties better enabled angel investors to make 
longer-term investments as legislation-related uncertainties reduced.  Thus, we saw 
how legislative uncertainty had previously led to short term investments. However as 
regulatory uncertainty declined, a longer-term view became possible. We are able to 
conceptualise two different forms of uncertainty. First the structural uncertainty and 
second behavioural or process uncertainty such as moral or performance hazard. 
Initially, ties addressed the risks manifest in both forms, for structural risks, the 
investment outcome was short term flexibility, but as legislation became stronger, the 
perceived riskiness lowered allowing a longer term view. However, the processual 





Bonded relations between entrepreneurs and investors help reduce relational risk, but 
over time also developed trust in the capabilities of those entrepreneurs to grow the 
venture and achieve long-term business success. Furthermore, the nature of 
investment involvement extends beyond the provision of capital as a one-off event and 
demonstrates the faith in the individual. Investor B explained, “If this investment fails, 
I believe the entrepreneur would succeed in the future in which a chance of me playing 
a role in his business increases.” (Case B). It reflects a network-based investment 
strategy used by investors, strengthening the bonded relations in anticipation of future 
collaborations. The perceived benefit of embedded personal ties lies not only the 
current deal, but also in future collaborations. Mutual obligations form in this network-
based strategy that is demonstrably long term and processual.  Entrepreneurs are not 
only socially accountable for single event funding, but also address investor’s longer 
aspirations. These responsibilities are reciprocated, leading to a robust but flexible 
commercial platform. 
 
Investor B commented, “we (my university classmates and former colleagues) meet 
quite often, and chat about our businesses and life.” (Case B). This represents a robust 
and enduring social platform, created from shared social and cultural links, that 
enables informed interaction. Such socially embedded interactions can motivate all 
the stakeholders to share resources (Uzzi, 1999), even allowing investors to detect 
any potential problems and provide relevant advice or assistance at a very early stage.  
 





Under a weak regulatory framework,  government connections can assist a firm by 
helping win contracts, obtain grants, gain approval for doing business, solve disputes 
and provide information  (Li and Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Walder & Zhao, 2006; 
Zhou, 2013). Moreover, well connected early-stage ventures were perceived by 
investors to have a competitive advantage (Batjargal, 2010). This example shows the 
importance of these connections, “I frequently offer project-based equity finance to an 
entrepreneur who was my former employee. He has a better chance of winning 
contracts from one of my previous clients than myself, since the current senior 
manager of the client company is his classmate” (Case A, angel A, 2004 interview).  
 
Government officials hold considerable power in interpreting relatively unclear policies 
and for providing approval for businesses. Previously, even the protection of property 
rights needed a government official’s support (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006). With stronger 
regulation this power diminished. Investor B had an equity investment in a residential 
property development in 2007, “I had initially considered several local officials holding 
a proportion of business shares as a security for my investment in the business. 
However, they later failed to gain approval for the real estate development on time, 
leading to a trapped investment.” (Case B, 2015 interview). It appears this poor equity 
performance resulted from the reduced power of the government connections. 
  
As local authority control weakened, the benefits and competitive advantages of ties 
to officials also decreased. Investors A and B stated how sales of their high-quality 
batteries fell year by year because several of their university classmates moved to new 
positions and no longer helped win contracts (Cases A and B, 2009 and 2015). 




use of farmland for residential property development in 2009, and local government 
officials could not approve the documents that they had promised.” Investor A’s 
experience was worse: “The founder’s arrest caused my investee company to go 
completely wrong. He was accused of wrongdoing at his previous job as a local 
government official” (Case A, 2015 interview). We see this diminishing competitive 
advantage from government ties resulting from the stronger regulatory regime. 
 
Interestingly, entrepreneurs of early-stage ventures continue to network with some 
local government officials on the basis of shared personal identities. These 
entrepreneurs were the first to gain information about changes to the business 
environment (Xin & Pearce, 1996; Zhou, 2013). Critical structural information included 
policy changes, amendments to legislation and government support. “I was 
encouraged by my hometown fellow who works in local government to apply for a 
government grant and got it” (Entrepreneur 1 from Case A, 2015). Entrepreneurs 
maintained connections but put less effort into maintaining and strengthening 
relationships. Investor B commented: “in order to maintain a close friendship, I now 
offer small gifts to my classmates who work in the public sector” (Case B, 2015 
interview).  
 
Social processes and a simple contract  
 
Despite the availability of complex legally enforceable contracts, all our informants 
repeatedly told us about their simple contracts. We saw this as continuing reliance on 
the social obligations of network ties and the special relationships. We were told how 




maintained the bond. Such links also enable to investors socialise and connect with a 
third party (i.e. customer or supplier). This embedded personal networking process is 
profoundly social. The interaction processes build strong and enduring relationships 
which are much more flexible than a legal contract (Wang and Gordon, 2011). They 
also function as a powerful control mechanism over an investee venture (Ahlstrom and 
Bruton, 2006; Welter and Smallbone, 2008). The adaptability and flexibility helps with 
rectifying mistakes or misunderstandings, resolve conflicts of interest and minimise 
any negative impacts. This socially embedded mechanism appears very effective in 
conditions of remaining uncertainty. Of course, the problems associated with strong 
ties and over-embedding remain. It becomes difficult to avoid obligations when these 
become commercially problematic. More significantly, over-embedding closes off the 
arrangements for outsiders. The clique becomes a powerful clan that can shut out 
useful new members. 
 
Nonetheless, the simplicity of the contract with its implied obligations facilitated fast 
payments and deal flows. Our informants repeatedly commented: “I do not think it is 
necessary to produce a contract with a long list of covenants, and I always made a 
transfer of the full amount of capital agreed days after a simple contract has been 
signed” (2009 and 2015 interviews). This is also illustrated here: “I received the full 
amount of the investment capital from three business partners in a week after a simple 
contract signed” (Case A, entrepreneur A, 2009 and 2015 interview). The embedded 
network ties make a complex contract unnecessary, avoiding delays.  Indeed, legal 
complexity might even damage the trust between entrepreneurs and investors 





Nevertheless, there is also an awareness of shortcomings of these simple trust-based 
contracts. Investor B assessing the performance of his equity investment: “I could have 
received dividends by now if the entrepreneur had better managed the cash flow. I 
wish I had added more details about stock control to the contract” (Case B, 2015 
interview). Investor A grumbled, “I have not received any dividends from the firm run 
by my best friend, although the business has been doing well.” (Case A, 2016 
interview). Opinions about complex contracts did vary depending on a business 
partner. Investor C commenting on his 2014 investment: “I had a lawyer look at the 
contract drafted by the investee firm that is owned by Americans and operated in the 
US. It was new to me, but I am happy with the experience” (Case C, 2015 interview). 
It indicates that a subtle change in investors’ views over time, towards using a more 
detailed contracts when appropriate.  
 
This social situating of Chinese business suggests that practices may continue to differ 
from the US and Europe (De Clercq et al., 2006; and Fairchild, 2011; Ding et al., 2014).  
Although new regulations open possibilities for more market driven decision making, 
we found a continuing reliance on personal ties. Mike Wright had suggested we look 
closely at the interplay of institutions, formal and informal (Wright et al., 2005). We did 
this and found these nuanced relationships. We argue these are not solely market 
driven practices but seem almost determined by the cultural obligations that 
characterise the social ties of our investors. There are obvious advantages, but 
considerable problems for those lacking social connections. 
 
One of our reviewers astutely pointed out the processes of unfolding legitimacy in our 




balances, in cognitive legitimacy (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Tsang (1996) had 
pointed out the importance of legitimacy for entrepreneurs in China’s uncertain 
environment. Webb et al (2008) describe how formal institutions confer legal 
legitimacy on what may have been informally cognitively legitimate in terms of values 
and beliefs. They propose that entrepreneurial activities taking place in the informal 
economy fall within informal institutional boundaries (i.e., norms, values, and beliefs).  
De Clercq and Vornov (2009) discuss the social construction of legitimacy (cognitive) 
which Anderson and Smith (2007) described as the moral space of entrepreneurship. 
This serves as a useful conceptual contrast to political, formal institutional legitimacy 
in the dynamics of China’s move to a market economy.  
 
Discussion, future direction and conclusion  
 
Using Mike Wright’s insights, we identify, chart and theorise the roles and practices of 
business angels’ network ties in changing formal institutional environments. We found 
strong evidence of how profoundly social relationships shaped investors’ decision 
making and how they monitored the processes. The attitudes of Chinese people 
towards entrepreneurship became more positive as the institutional environments 
improved (Smallbone et al., 2020). The enhanced confidence encouraged much 
longer term financing and investment. This contrasts with the short term and flexible 
lending of the less regulated regime. We theorised the evolution of angel investment 
practice is a response to structure, the uncertainty of what governments might do. We 
showed how social ties provided an effective mechanism to overcome the structural 
uncertainty in dysfunctional institutional environments. The obligations associated with 




uncertainty is reduced. Investment decisions were made in the relationship, rather 
than in the business.  
 
As regulatory uncertainty reduced, tie role and work shifted to prioritise the impact on 
processes rather than structure. The changing role of ties focused on opportunistic 
risk rather than legislation-related uncertainty. We offered evidence from the much-
diminished importance of ties to government to support this analysis. This was not to 
say the influence and importance of ties reduced, it merely changed. We saw more 
sophisticated and longer-term investments shaped by strong social ties. In 
evolutionary terms, the role of ties moved to more general management of the 
investment processes. Knowledge and experience evolved too and played a greater 
role. We noted how regular social exchanges such as meetings and family 
involvement- socialising- maintained obligations. What did not change was the source 
of the tie, links were always formed from historical affiliations; classmates or shared 
home towns. We criticised this as over-embedding, because it seriously restricts the 
range of connections. 
 
Our overview was that these transactions demonstrate the socially embedded nature 
of business in China. It could be argued that ours were extreme cases of operating in 
conditions of uncertainty. The new ventures had no track records and the 
entrepreneurs were largely new to the game. The products often had novelty and 
markets were unclear and the angels lacked investment experience. Yet even as 
extreme cases, they shed light on how business processes are embedded in social 
relations. In such a potent mix of risk and ambiguity with obscure outcomes, this falling 




even when some uncertainty was removed, the socialised system of network ties and 
socially defined obligations moved ties from control mechanisms to being used to 
fasciate better, larger and longer deals. It appears use of the system evolved to meet 
the changed circumstances. This seems to us to confirm our view of Chinese business 
practices as socially embedded and socially enacted. 
 
Future research, implications and directions 
 
We noted how the extent of uncertainty made ours an extreme case. It would be helpful 
to examine the roles of ties in less extreme conditions. Moreover, we asserted that 
culture created the usefulness of these social ties. Hence it could be useful to examine 
finance and credit practices in different Asian contexts. This could establish the 
uniqueness of Chinese culture. Ours were strong ties, yet the literature suggests that 
weak ties bridge structural holes. Consequently, a future focus on weak tie 
development would be interesting. Finally, we will continue to monitor these angels in 
the increasing marketization and maturity of the Chinese economy. Evolution may take 
personal ties and networking in interesting new directions. 
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